Rural resource idleness is a major obstacle to the high-quality development of the rural economy, and digital production-village integration is an important way to activate idle rural resources. Local governments, agricultural enterprises, rural collective economic organizations, and farmers as the mainparticipants in digital production-village integration. Their behaviors will affect the evolution trend of digital production-village integration that activates idle rural resources. This paper constructs a “local government-agricultural enterprise-rural collective economic organization-farmer” four-party evolutionary game model for digital production-village integration and conducts numerical simulation analysis of the stable strategies and evolutionary trends of the four-party game subjects under different parameter changes. The results show that the strategy selection of relevant subjects is determined by relative net income. The degree of local government enforcement and the degree of participation of rural collective economic organizations in digital production-village integration is proportional to the system’s evolution towards an ideal state. Local government subsidies are also proportional to it, but it shows marginal diminishing returns when it reaches a certain level. Finally, the relevant suggestions are put forward from increasing local government supervision, improving the four-party interest linkage mechanism, and giving full play to the advantages of rural collective economic organizations.