政策信号的多层级传递与市级政府行为合规:基于环境信息公开案例的实证研究
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F293;X322

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国家自然科学基金青年项目“政策信号有效传递与地方环境治理绩效提升路径研究——基于信号传递理论的视角”(72104260)。


Multilevel transmission of policy signals and compliance of lower-level governments:An empirical study based on the case of environmental information disclosure
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    摘要:

    政策信号是传递上级政府治理意向、激励下级政府行为合规的重要手段。分析政策信号多层级作用机制下市级政府2008—2018年环境信息公开行为发现,政府组织中的上层与中层信号均会显著影响下层政府合规行为;在多层级传递过程中,政策信号的影响随行政级别差异的增加而减弱;中间环节传递的不一致信号会削弱上层政府信号效果;在交互作用中,上层政府的“强信号”将翻转中层政府的“不一致”信号,而“弱信号”则可能被后者抵消。在此基础上,提出研究结论与政策建议。

    Abstract:

    Policy signals are an important means of conveying the governance intentions of higher-level governments and motivating lower level governments to act in compliance. Analyzing the multi-level mechanism of policy signals and the environmental information disclosure behavior of city-level governments from 2008 to 2018, it was found that both upper-and middle-level governments’ signals significantly affect the compliance behavior of lower-level governments. In the process of multi-level transmission, the influence of policy signals weakens with the increase of administrative level differences. The inconsistent signals transmitted in the intermediate links will weaken the signal effect of the upper-level governments. In the interactions, the “strong signal” of the upper-level government will flip the “inconsistent” signal of the middle-level governments, while the “weak signal” may be offset by the latter. On this basis, research conclusions and policy recommendations were proposed.

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李珒.政策信号的多层级传递与市级政府行为合规:基于环境信息公开案例的实证研究[J].中国软科学,2024,(5):188-196

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  • 在线发布日期: 2026-06-30
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