As a special arrangement form of equity structure, persons acting in concert are one of the important corporate governance mechanisms. This article takes A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen as the research object, and empirically tests the impact and path of persons acting in concert on real earnings management. The empirical results indicate that: (1) persons acting in concert can constrain real earnings management behavior, manifested as the higher the shareholding ratio of persons acting in concert, the lower the level of real earnings management. (2) Impact channels analysis found that, persons acting in concert suppress the level of real earnings management through three paths: reducing the level of second type agency, improving company transparency, and improving internal control quality. (3) Further research has found that, high-quality audits, media attention, and analyst tracking can suppress the true level of earnings management, and have a substitute effect on the governance effectiveness of persons acting in concert. This article provides new evidence from the perspective of equity structure on how to suppress real earnings management, and has enlightening significance for strengthening external supervision and improving corporate governance.