Abstract:The collaboration between the eastern and western regions injects strong momentum into the economic development of the western region, effectively breaking the constraints of regional development imbalance and comprehensively promoting high-quality economic growth in the west. Under the condition of bounded rationality, the evolutionary game model composed of “assisting government-recipient government-Enterprises-populace” can reveal the multi-agent coordination mechanism under the “providing both fish and fishing skills” dual teaching mode of industrial cooperation between the East and the west, and explore the multi-agent behavior evolution and stability strategy under different parameter changes. The results show that: the transfer payment of the assisting government can effectively stimulate the cooperation between the eastern and western industrial entities, so as to achieve “providing fish”, but it shows a marginal diminishing effect after reaching a certain degree. The benefits and reputation of stakeholders’ active participation in the industrial cooperation policy between the East and the west can promote them to give full exert to their subjective initiative and realize “providing fishing skills”. The degree of cooperation and subsidies of the assisting government can promote enterprises and the populace to actively participate in cooperation between the East and the West, but the incentive effect of the policy role will weaken in the later stage. Reducing the cost of cooperation between enterprises and the populace can promote the system to evolve into an ideal state. Finally, relevant suggestions are put forward to strengthen the coordination between “the assisting government and the recipient government,” improve the interest linkage mechanism of multiple stakeholders, and enhance the endogenous motivation of enterprises and people.