基于双重身份平台企业的多元主体协同治理策略研究
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C93

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国家社会科学基金青年项目“涉农平台经济现代化治理体系构建研究”(22CJY040);陕西省哲学社会科学研究专项“平台经济下新型劳动关系中的工会组织机制创新研究”(2025HZ0791)。


Study on the multi-agent collaborative governance strategies of dual-identity platform enterprises
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    摘要:

    平台企业作为平台经济中多元主体协同治理的主要参与者,不仅兼具市场“中立性”和企业“逐利性”双重属性,而且同时拥有监管者和被监管者双重身份,这种特殊性极大地增加了平台经济治理的难度。针对双重身份平台企业参与多元主体协同治理问题,引入实际案例进行特征事实分析,创造性提出一种全新的二维空间策略集合分析框架,在传统演化博弈基础上构建出33演化博弈模型,对稳定性进行灵敏度分析。研究发现:平台企业扮演监管者角色时,政府部门作为监管“监管者”对其实施监督,消费者举报能够抑制平台商家违规经营行为,平台企业连带责任过大反而会打击平台企业的积极性;平台企业扮演被监管者角色时,政府部门作为监管者对平台企业的垄断行为进行监管,平台企业垄断成本和垄断额外收益是平台企业是否选择垄断策略的主要依据,处于弱势地位的平台用户起诉只能缓解平台企业垄断行为,不能从根本上起到震慑作用。

    Abstract:

    As the main participants in the collaborative governance of multiple entities in the platform economy, platform enterprises not only possess the dual attributes of market neutrality and corporate profit seeking, but also have the dual identities of regulators and regulated entities, which greatly increases the difficulty of platform economy governance. This paper addresses the issue of dual-identity platform enterprises participating in multi-agent collaborative governance. It introduces real-world cases for empirical analysis and creatively proposes a novel two-dimensional spatial strategy set analysis framework. Building on the traditional evolutionary game theory, it constructs a 33 evolutionary game model and conducts a sensitivity analysis of stability. Research has found that when platform companies play the role of regulators, government departments act as regulatory “regulators” to supervise them. Consumer reports can suppress platform merchants’ illegal business behavior, while excessive joint liability of platform companies can actually undermine their enthusiasm; When platform enterprises play the role of regulated entities, government departments act as regulators to supervise the monopolistic behavior of platform enterprises. The cost and additional benefits of monopoly are the main basis for platform enterprises to choose monopoly strategies. Lawsuits by platform users in a disadvantaged position can only alleviate the monopolistic behavior of platform enterprises, but cannot fundamentally deter them.

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张旺,黄伟.基于双重身份平台企业的多元主体协同治理策略研究[J].中国软科学,2025,(4):138-154

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  • 在线发布日期: 2026-06-03
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