The improvement of relevant governance rules and the optimization of governance mechanisms are of great significance for enhancing the regular supervision level of China’s platform economy and promoting its innovative development. Based on this, this paper takes digital copyright as an example to construct a two-stage evolutionary game model. By analyzing the strategic choice process of all parties and the stability of the system’s equilibrium points, it explores a multi-party collaborative governance mechanism of the platform that organically combines “an efficient market” and “a well-functioning government”. The research findings are as follows:(1) Compared with the market mechanism, the probability of achieving Pareto optimality in the evolution of stable results under the policy mechanism increases, and the state organs guide the “Government and court collaboration-platform responsibility fulfillment-public participation” formation of a tripartite co-governance situation; (2) The platform is the core force in the governance of digital copyright infringement,the dominant strategy of the platform is to undertake the obligation of technical review; (3) Compared with rewards, adjusting the platform governance rules and support system for fulfilling responsibilities can more effectively enhance the platform’s review enthusiasm and the total amount of system benefits; (4) Both administrative law enforcement and judicial trials can curb users’ infringement behaviors. Appropriate protection models should be selected based on the development of the platform and the governance capabilities of the institution; (5) Enhancing the cost of user infringement, the technical capabilities of the platform, and the intensity of administrative law enforcement and judicial protection will effectively curb the chaos of infringement and piracy.