The EU’s external economic security regulation is premised on the identification of different sources of economic security risks and has developed two distinct regulatory responses: the reciprocity logic, which addresses institutional risks arising from third countries, and the competition review logic, which targets competitive risks stemming from the conduct of third-country undertakings.The logic of reciprocity, grounded in the principle of reciprocity, takes third-country institutional arrangements as its regulatory object and seeks to promote reciprocal market opennessthrough country-specific investigations, institutional assessments, and conditional market access restrictions. By contrast, the logic of competition review, grounded in the principle of competitive neutrality, focuses on firm-level conduct and aims to remedy distortions of competition through case-by-case investigations, determinations of foreign subsidy-induced market distortions, and corresponding remedial measures. The International Procurement Instrumentand and The Foreign Subsidies Regulation serve asrepresentative legislative instruments embodying the operation of these two regulatory logics.A comparative analysis of the two instruments demonstrates that the two logics differ significantly in terms of their governance functions, governance stages, and the legal justifications underpinning their operation, while also operating in a complementary manner through the coordinated application of different legal instruments, generating complementary regulatory targets, cumulative regulatory effects, and coordinated strategic objectives.This evolving regulatory framework imposes systematic institutional constraints on the business operations of Chinese enterprises in the EU. At the same time, it provides valuable insights for China in improving its economic security risk identification mechanism, optimizing its economic security legal toolbox, and strengthening its capacity for the governance of foreign-related economic security.