大股东股权、经理自主权与公司绩效
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F271 F276.6

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国家自然科学基金项目(No.70372052),中国博士后科研基金项目(No.2003033456)


The Effect of Managerial Discretion on Relationship between Ownership Structure and Firm Performance
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    摘要:

    经理自主权是反映经理与董事会关系的制度安排集合。理论分析和实证数据表明,以职位权和报酬权测量的经理自主权指数随公司股权集中度提高而下降,呈凹函数形态。股权结构是影响公司绩效的外生变量,其机理在于改变经理自主权安排,从而影响公司绩效,但数据显示经理自主权作为中间变量的影响作用不显著。

    Abstract:

    We presume that managerial discretion is a moderating variable, which influences relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance. Based on the managerial discretion theory, we introduce managerial discretion into the Burkart and Gromb's model, and then deduce two hypotheses. Using data of 117 largest shareholder controlling firms (Z index more than 5), through the curve estimation procedure and hierarchical regression, we find that (1) managerial discretion is a exponential function of ownership structure (alpha), decreasing with alpha increasing, (2) there is a significant inverse relationship between firm performance and ownership structure, (3) the interactive effect of ownership structure and managerial discretion on performance is not significant.

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李有根 赵西萍.大股东股权、经理自主权与公司绩效[J].中国软科学,2004,(4):86-92

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  • 最后修改日期:2003-12-29
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