大股东终极控制权增长模式与隐性收益
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F272.5

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国家自然科学基金资助项目(70172001)


Research on Ultimate Control and Invisible Benefits of Controlling Shareholders
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    摘要:

    从控制权与现金流权分离的视角研究了大股东终极控制的模式与隐性收益。金字塔式控股结构和交叉持股是大股东实现控制权与现金流权分离的两种重要方式,造成了大股东对小股东掠夺行为的强烈动机。通过建立一个模型分析了大股东掠夺行为产生的机理,大股东能够用较少的现金流权来实现对公司的实质控制是掠夺行为产生的本质原因,从而攫取更多的控制权隐性收益。

    Abstract:

    The paper analyzes the ultimate control models and invisible benefits of large shareholders according to the separation of control rights and cash flow rights. Pyramidal ownership structures and cross-ownership structures are two important approaches to separate control rights from cash flow rights for large shareholders. And the approaches give strong incentives in large shareholders to control shareholders and expropriate small shareholders. The paper introduces a model to analyze the producing mechanism of large shareholders' expropriation. Based on the model, the paper discusses the essential reason for expropriation, and concludes the reason is that large shareholders can obtain absolute control rights by possessing smaller cash flow rights; consequently, they are able to snatch more invisible benefits from control.

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徐晋 张祥建 郭岚.大股东终极控制权增长模式与隐性收益[J].中国软科学,2005,(1):41-45

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  • 最后修改日期:2004-08-18
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