国企治理新模式:多元目标、相容激励和有效委托理论及实证分析
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F832.5

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国家科技成果推广计划;吉林大学校科研和教改项目;东北师范大学校科研和教改项目


The New Governance Mechanism of State-owned Enterprises:Multi-goals, Incentive Compatibility, and Efficient Principal Mechanism Designing Theory and the Empirical Study
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    摘要:

    改革实践表明,只关注代理人问题无法囊括我国国有企业当前正发生的所有现象,企业业绩也取决于委托人的委托效率:若企业存在多元委托目标,只有解决好委托目标的非兼容和非一致性问题时,企业才可能实现最优效率;我国国企经理最优选择往往是“晋升”、“退出”等非市场效率目标,导致国有企业经营的低效率。我国国企改革应认识到:并非国有企业就一定等价于低效率;国企改革应同等关注委托人有效委托问题,只有开展委托代理的双向改革才有可能解决国有企业治理问题。

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    The reform deduces that if the state owned firms only focus on the interest conflicts of the acts of the principals and the agents,it doesn't include all the problems of the state owned firms currently,and the firm profit also depends on the principal efficiency.The paper concludes that: first,only when the firms solve the incompatible and noncoherence problem,they can get the best efficiency if there are multi-principal goals in the firms; Secondly,the best selection of managers is on the no market goal of getting promotion or exiting which leads to the low efficiency of state owned firms.The paper deduces that: the state owned firm is not equal to the low efficiency,and that the reform of the state owned firm focuses on both the agents and principals.All these reforms can completely solve the governance problem of the state owned firm.

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李富强,王林辉,董直庆.国企治理新模式:多元目标、相容激励和有效委托理论及实证分析[J].中国软科学,2006,(1):124-131

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  • 收稿日期:2005-12-01
  • 最后修改日期:2006-01-08
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