基于期权博弈的基础设施BOT项目二阶段特许权期决策模型
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F282

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国家自然科学基金;陕西省软科学基金


Two -stage Concession Term Decision Model for Infrastructure BOT Projects Based on Option Game
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    摘要:

    本文采用期权博弈方法就二阶段基础设施BOT项目的建设成本和特许权期的决策问题进行了研究。发现在维护成本随时问变化条件下,成长期权对政府和项目公司的博弈结果都会产生一定影响。对均衡解的讨论显示,拥有成长期权的项目公司在特许权期缩短情况下,为实现其战略目标仍将增加投入,延长项目寿命期。

    Abstract:

    This paper adopted option game method to explore the construction cost of two - stage concession term decision model of infrastructure BOT project and concession term decision. It was found that the growth option would affect the game result both for government and project companies on the condition of maintenance cost changing over time. The author discussed the strategy solution that had showed the project companies which the growth option that would increase the investment for achieving its strategic target to enhance the lifecycle of project under the condition that the concession term comes short. At last this paper gave an example to confirm this result.

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杨屹,郭明靓,扈文秀.基于期权博弈的基础设施BOT项目二阶段特许权期决策模型[J].中国软科学,2007,(6):81-85

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  • 收稿日期:2007-01-21
  • 最后修改日期:2007-05-25
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